sounds like a good book, gonna give it a read this summer...
DoD News: Secretary of Defense Interview with Bob Woodward - 23 Oct, 2003
(Interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. Also participating was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Lawrence Di Rita and the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Lt. Gen. John Craddock)
Just part of the transcript it is pretty long and is all at the above link.
Q: What was the hardest moment in this for you if there was one? In the whole thing I mean?
Rumsfeld: Well it's an enormous decision -- one just does not do -- engage in a war -- lightly, and it was something that you thought about and thought about and thought about, and at a certain point knowing it's not your decision or even your recommendation. It is something that you have to -- my whole focus was less on that than it was on making sure that we had done everything humanly possible to prepare him for what could go wrong, to prepare so that things would go right.
Q: Do you have that list of the things that could go wrong?
Rumsfeld: I do.
Q: Is that something I could get?
Rumsfeld: I looked at it this morning and the answer is no. It is --
Q: You've read some before to reporters. Can you give me some -- it's three pages? Is there a date because General Myers said you kept revising it?
Rumsfeld: There are 29 items, and it begins by saying Iraq, an illustrative list of potential problems to be considered and addressed. "The following is illustrative list of the types of problems that could result from a conflict with Iraq. It's offered simply as a checklist so that they are part of our deliberations." It ends. And then there's 29 items and then it ends by saying "Note: It is possible, of course, to prepare a similar illustrative list of all of the potential problems that need to be considered if there is no regime change in Iraq." So I'm saying, look here's all the bad stuff, on the other hand, there's a risk of action, there's a risk of inaction.
Q: This is Cheney's point always.
Rumsfeld: And the --
Q: Give me a range of like what's the first one and some -- not the language from them, but just so that I can --?
Rumsfeld: Well you would have to be aware of it while you were engaged in Iraq another state could try to take advantage of your involvement or pre-occupation. Oil disruption could cause an international shock wave. Iraqi intelligence services have a global presence including in the U.S., and could strike the U.S., our allies or other deployed forces in unconventional ways. There could be higher than expected collateral damage.
Q: You're smiling. The smiling is breaking my heart.
Rumsfeld: Fortress Baghdad could prove to be long and unpleasant for all. Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds, as they did at an earlier period. Iraq could use chemical weapons against the Shi'a and blame the United States, Iraq could successfully best us in public relations and persuade the world that it was a war against Muslims, which it was not. They're just a whole host of those things.
Q: Is there a date on that final -- is that the final version?
Rumsfeld: No, this one is dated October 15th so it was -- what happened was I was sitting in an NSC meeting --
Q: You told me this last time.
Rumsfeld: And I doodled with a bunch of things and I developed a list of about 15 things and I said look, we better keep this in mind, and I listed all 15 of these, then I came back and wrote the 15 and added and made the list and then I sent it around to 3 or 4 people and they added a couple of items and that was the final. But it was months before March.
Q: Right, October 15th, 2002.
Rumsfeld: And the earlier draft, I bet you, was a month before that so.
Q: And then you went over that list with the President?
Rumsfeld: In the NSC meeting I did it, and off the top of my head the 15 plus or minus, and then at a later date I sent this to him and walked him through it. You bet, and our people here.
Q: Kept adding to it?
Rumsfeld: No, I would go over them because these are things we have to take account of and be prepared to deal with.
Q: Did you recommend going to war in the end? Was it --
Rumsfeld: It's an interesting question. There's no question in anyone's mind, but I agreed with the President's approach and his decision. Whether there ever was a formal moment where he asked me, do I think he should go to war, I can't recall that. I do recall him going around to his combatant commanders and saying, can we win this?
Q: Are you ready? Do you have everything you need?
Di Rita: And the Chiefs too.
Rumsfeld: And the Chiefs, around the room twice with the Chiefs, and I can remember him asking me, do I have confidence in General Franks? Do I have confidence in the war plan? And do I have confidence in these pieces?
Q: When did he ask you that?
Rumsfeld: Oh I don't remember but I just know that he had to develop confidence that this institution, which is his instrument -- the country's instrument -- had thoroughly examined these things, and that they were people in whom he had developed a level of confidence that he knew on what things they were strong and what things he could give them a long leash on, what things he wanted a shorter leash and he did a -- he functioned as a superb executive in the process of this.
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Hey click on the link for more, It is pretty long and a good read.
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